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GarblingThe literature on income smoothing focuses on the eﬀect of earnings smooth-
ing on the equity market. This paper investigates the eﬀect of income smooth-
ing on the debt market. Using the Tucker–Zarowin (TZ) statistic of income
smoothing, we ﬁnd that ﬁrms with higher income smoothing rankings exhibit
lower cost of debt, suggesting that the information signaling eﬀect of income
smoothing dominates the garbling eﬀect. We also ﬁnd that the eﬀect of earn-
ings smoothing on debt cost reduction is stronger in ﬁrms with more opaque
information and greater distress risk.
 2016 Sun Yat-sen University. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. This
is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecom-
mons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
Although income smoothing has existed for decades, there is limited academic research on earnings
smoothing. For example, Graham et al. (2005) report that ‘‘an overwhelming 96.9% of the survey respondents
indicate that they prefer a smooth earnings path. Such a strong enthusiasm among managers for smooth
earnings is perhaps not reﬂected in the academic literature.” More recently, Dichev et al. (2013) state that
‘‘earnings management is driven by a host of intertwined factors but capital market motivations dominate,
followed by debt contracting, and career and compensation issues.”
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presents an arguably eﬃcient vehicle for managers to reveal private information because it is easier for inves-
tors to predict future earnings from smoother earnings. Second, smoothing represents ‘‘garbling”; that is,
smoothing is an exercise undertaken by managers in an attempt to fool analysts and others and to enhance
managerial careers or compensation. The ﬁrst school of thought (the information signaling view) is reﬂected
in the works of Ronen and Sadan (1981), Demski (1998), Sankar and Subramanyam (2001), Srinidhi et al.
(2001), Kirschenheiter and Melumad (2002) and Goel (2003), among others. Essentially, this school holds that
income smoothing may reveal private information in much the same way that dividend smoothing can lead to
information revelation (Miller and Rock, 1985). The second school of thought (the information garbling view)
is reﬂected in the works of Beidleman (1973), Lambert (1984), Healy (1985), Fudenberg and Tirole (1995),
Arya et al. (1998) and Demski and Frimor (1999), among others.
A handful of empirical studies have investigated the issue of income smoothing in the context of equity
markets. Subramanyam (1996) ﬁnds that stock returns are positively associated with contemporaneous discre-
tionary accruals, which are a measure of income smoothing. Hunt et al. (2000) ﬁnd that income smoothing
improves price-earnings multiples. Tucker and Zarowin (2006) report that the changes in the current stock
prices of higher smoothing ﬁrms contain more information about these ﬁrms’ future earnings than do the
changes in the current stock prices of lower smoothing ﬁrms. Taken collectively, these studies support the
notion that income smoothing represents an eﬃcient vehicle for managers to reveal private information. Using
survey data, Graham et al. (2005) ﬁnd that the overwhelming majority of managers prefer a smooth earnings
growth rate.2
Instead of examining the eﬀect of income smoothing on the equity market, our paper examines the eﬀect of
income smoothing on the credit market. If income smoothing is informative and mitigates the asymmetric
information problem between the ﬁrm and investors, then smoothing ﬁrms may exhibit a lower cost of debt
capital due to lower information risk. This idea follows from the theory in Trueman and Titman (1988), who
argue that a smooth earnings stream may potentially decrease assessments of default risk, and thus decrease
the debt cost of capital. However, if income smoothing is garbling, and creditors can recognize smoothing as
garbling, then smoothing ﬁrms could exhibit a higher cost of debt capital as creditors punish managers for
gaming earnings.
Investigating the credit market is of great interest for the following reasons. First, investors in the bond
market are predominantly institutional investors. For example, transactions with less than $1 million face
value are considered ‘‘odd lots” (that is, less than the normal unit of trading). Because creditors are typically
professional investors, they may be more able than equity stakeholders to diﬀerentiate the information eﬀect
from the garbling eﬀect. Therefore, examining the signaling versus garbling debate through the lens of credit
markets can help enhance our understanding of earnings smoothing. Second, Lang and Maﬀett (2011) argue
that ﬁrm-level transparency could aﬀect equity and debt diﬀerently. They mention that ‘‘Earnings smoothing
is likely to be a particular issue. . .given the importance of stakeholders other than equity investors. In partic-
ular, stakeholders such as labor unions, governments and debt holders are exposed more directly to losses than
to gains and so prefer lower risk. As a consequence, managers have incentives to report smooth earnings to
create the impression of a less risky earnings stream.” Managers have incentives to signal to the market to
obtain debt ﬁnancing at a lower cost because, all else being equal, lower debt costs imply more money left
for shareholders and managers.
In addition to contributing to the literature on incoming smoothing, this study is related to extant studies
that identify the determinants of the cost of debt. For example, Chen et al. (2007) report that bond liquidity is
an important factor in explaining corporate yield spreads. Tang and Yan (2006) document liquidity eﬀects
with respect to credit default swap spreads. Our research suggests that income smoothing could serve as an
additional factor that determines the cost of debt, as measured by credit spreads. Finally, this study is related
to a growing body of research that addresses the issue of accounting transparency and asset pricing. In this
context, the research presented here is perhaps most closely related to Yu (2005), who ﬁnds that ﬁrms with2 As far as we know, there is no direct empirical evidence for how earnings smoothing aﬀects the cost of equity capital. The accounting
literature does provide evidence that earnings management (as measured by accrual quality) ‘‘is frequently considered to increase opacity,
decrease liquidity and increase equity cost of capital” (Lang and Maﬀett, 2011).
S. Li, N. Richie / China Journal of Accounting Research 9 (2016) 175–190 177more information disclosure (measured as AIMR disclosure rankings) tend to exhibit lower credit spreads.3
Yu’s (2005) ﬁndings are consistent with the theory of discretionary disclosure that began with Verrecchia
(1983), and with the incomplete accounting information model of Duﬃe and Lando (2001). By examining
income smoothing, our paper provides evidence for whether income smoothing enhances (or reduces) the
quality of information disclosure, which can be further translated into lower (or higher) cost of debt.
Using a large sample of publicly traded companies and the Tucker and Zarowin (2006) measure of income
smoothing, we examine whether higher smoothing ﬁrms witness higher or lower cost of debt than their lower
smoothing counterparts. The results indicate that higher smoothing ﬁrms exhibit lower cost of debt, both
unconditionally and after controlling for factors previously known to explain credit spreads. Our results
further suggest that the information signaling eﬀect of income smoothing in reducing the cost of debt is
stronger in ﬁrms with more opaque information, such as smaller ﬁrms. The eﬀect is also stronger in ﬁrms with
more distress risk, such as more volatile, less proﬁtable and lower credit rating ﬁrms. Assuming that creditors
are not fooled by income smoothing, the evidence presented here from the credit market aﬃrms the conclusion
drawn from most of the existing research using equity market data, namely that income smoothing may aid
management to revel private information.
2. Research design
2.1. Measuring income smoothing
Income smoothing is commonly understood to mean management’s use of discretionary accounting and
management principles to reduce earnings variability. The main income smoothing measure used in this study
is the standard metric used in the literature. Following Myers and Skinner (2002), Leuz et al. (2003), and
Tucker and Zarowin (2006), we estimate income smoothing as the negative correlation between the change
in a ﬁrm’s discretionary-accruals proxy (DDAP) and the change in its pre-discretionary income (DPDI). This
measure assumes that there is an innate, un-managed income series and that management uses discretionary
accruals to smooth this raw series. When there is an increase (decrease) in the pre-discretionary income, a ﬁrm
will use negative (positive) discretionary accruals to smooth its earnings. As a result, income smoothing is
presented as the negative correlation between DDAP and DPDI, and more income smoothing is evidenced
by a greater degree of negative correlation between DDAP and DPDI.
To estimate discretionary accruals, we follow Tucker and Zarowin (2006) by using the cross-sectional
version of the Jones (1991) model as modiﬁed by Kothari et al. (2005), namely:3 ‘‘A
4 DaACCRUALSt ¼ b0ð1=ASSETSt1Þ þ b1DSALESt þ b2PPEt þ b3ROAt þ et; ð1Þ
where ASSETS is total assets; ACCRUALS stands for total accruals estimated as net income minus operating
cash ﬂows, deﬂated by lagged total assets; DSALES is change in sales scaled by lagged total assets; and PPE is
gross property, plant and equipment scaled by lagged total assets.4 ROA, return on assets, is measured as net
income over lagged total assets. Following Tucker and Zarowin (2006), we include ROA in the regression
because previous research ﬁnds that the Jones model is misspeciﬁed for well-performing or poorly performing
ﬁrms (see Dechow et al., 1995 and Kothari et al., 2005). We also follow Tucker and Zarowin (2006) and omit a
separate intercept term in regression (1). We perform a robustness analysis by estimating regression (1) with an
intercept term, as in Eq. (7) of Kothari et al. (2005), and obtain similar results.
Non-discretionary accruals (NDAP) of ﬁrm j are then represented by the ﬁtted values of regression (1):NDAPj;t ¼ b^0ð1=ASSETSj;t1Þ þ b^1DSALESj;t þ b^2PPEj;t þ b^3ROAj:t: ð2Þ
Discretionary accruals (DAP) are represented by the residuals, that is, the deviations of actual accruals
from NDAP. The un-managed income series, i.e., pre-discretionary income (PDI), is calculated as net income
(NI) minus discretionary accruals, or PDI = NI  DAP. Note that as DAP is assets-scaled, NI should also be
assets-scaled here.IMR” stands for the Association for Investment Management and Research, the former name of the CFA Institute.
ta deﬁnitions and measurement details for all of the variables are reported in the Appendix.
Table 1
Estimation of discretionary accruals and income smoothing.
Panel A: Summary statistics of the estimated coeﬃcients from the modiﬁed Jones’ model
Coeﬃcient Mean Std Dev Median Minimum Maximum
b0 0.091 2.486 0.057 66.264 13.903
b1 0.009 0.287 0.005 3.046 3.053
b2 0.063 0.270 0.079 3.117 3.512
b3 0.501 0.344 0.494 0.910 1.940
Adj. R2 0.683 0.262 0.721 0.170 1.000
Panel B: Summary statistics of the income smoothing variable
Variable N Mean Median Std Dev Minimum Maximum
DAP 60,448 0.036 0.023 1.527 162.540 166.535
TZStatistic = Corr(DDAP, DPDI) 60,448 0.731 0.922 0.421 1.000 1.000
Panel A presents the summary statistics from regression (1) of the estimated coeﬃcients and adjusted R2 of the Jones (1991) model, as
modiﬁed by Kothari et al. (2005):
ACCRUALSt ¼ b0ð1=ASSETSt1Þ þ b1DSALESt þ b2PPEt þ b3ROAt þ et
The regression is estimated using all of the ﬁrms in the same industry (two-digit SIC) for each year, using annual data for the 1988–2007
period. There are 951 industry-year regressions and the obtained estimates are summarized in the following table. ACCRUALS, DSALES,
PPE and ROA are scaled by lagged assets. Panel B reports the summary statistics of the income smoothing measures in which discre-
tionary accruals is DAP and pre-discretionary income (PDI) = Net income (NI)  DAP. Detailed deﬁnitions of the variables are reported
in the Appendix.
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change in un-managed income, Corr(DDAP, DPDI), using the current year’s and past four years’ observa-
tions. Firms with more negative correlations are higher smoothing ﬁrms, whereas ﬁrms with less negative
(or positive) correlations are lower smoothing ﬁrms. For ease of interpretation, we follow Tucker and
Zarowin (2006) in creating our ﬁnal income smoothing measure (IS), by converting the correlations into
reverse fractional rankings by 2-digit industry SIC code. The IS measure ranges from 0 to 1 by industry-
year with the highest income smoothers (most negative correlations) having high rankings and lowest income
smoothers (less negative correlations) having low rankings.
We estimate regression (1) using all of the ﬁrms in the same industry (two-digit SIC) each year for the 1988
to 2007 period. We obtain the information on the variables from Compustat. Our sample starts in 1988
because one key variable that is used to estimate accruals, cash ﬂow from operations, is only available from
Compustat after 1988. Our sample stops just prior to the credit crisis that began in 2008. Because this study
relies heavily on credit market data, we have chosen to avoid the issues associated with illiquidity and lack of
reliable bond pricing that existed beginning in 2008. We exclude all of the ﬁrms in SIC codes 4000–4999
(regulated industries) and 6000–6999 (ﬁnancial industries) because ﬁrms in these industries may have distinct
types of accounting and debt costs. We then sort the sample ﬁrms by 2-digit SIC category per year. We discard
any cross-section with less than 10 ﬁrms per industry-year category, resulting in 951 industry-year cross
sections. Following the literature (Tucker and Zarowin, 2006), we Winsorize the variables used in Eq. (1)
at ± three standard deviations per year.5
To show that our income smoothing estimates are in line with those presented in the literature, we ﬁrst pro-
vide the regression (1) estimation results in Table 1 Panel A and show that the main statistics of the coeﬃcient
estimates in the accruals equation are comparable to those reported by Subramanyam (1996) and Tucker and
Zarowin (2006). In addition, similar to Tucker and Zarowin (2006), we ﬁnd that the mean coeﬃcient on ROA
is 0.501, indicating that accruals are positively related to proﬁtability.
Table 1 Panel B presents the summary statistics of income smoothing variables in our sample. The earnings
smoothing correlation Corr(DDAP, DPDI) is 0.731, on average, with a median value of 0.922, which is5 We also Winsorize at ± three standard deviations per industry-year and ﬁnd the results are qualitatively similar.
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respectively.2.2. Estimating the cost of debt
In an eﬀort to improve bond market transparency, the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD)
began collecting and reporting bond transaction data in July 2002, using the Trade Reporting and Compliance
Engine (TRACE). The TRACE system is designed to allow NASD members to ‘‘report over-the-counter
(OTC) secondary market transactions in eligible ﬁxed income securities to NASD and subject certain trans-
action reports to dissemination.”6 The Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine is the FINRA-developed
vehicle that facilitates the mandatory reporting of over-the-counter secondary market transactions in eligible
ﬁxed income securities. All of the broker/dealers who are FINRA member ﬁrms have an obligation to report
transactions in corporate bonds to TRACE under a SEC-approved set of rules. The system captures and
disseminates consolidated information on secondary market transactions in publicly traded TRACE-
eligible securities (investment grade, high yield and convertible corporate debt) representing all of the
over-the-counter market activity in these bonds. The original TRACE-eligible securities included 500
corporate bonds of which 50 were high-yield securities. Currently, transaction data are reported for over
4000 diﬀerent bond issues with approximately 20 percent of those issues being high-yield securities.
We use TRACE data to estimate the cost of debt for our sample of publicly traded ﬁrms from July 2002
through December 2007. The data are cleaned by eliminating all of the canceled or corrected trades, whether
the cancellation is entered on the same transaction date or entered on a diﬀerent transaction date.7 We further
clean the data by eliminating all of the ‘‘when-issue” trades and all of the trades that do not settle regular way.
We select trades where the price excludes commission and, following Edwards et al. (2007), where the trade
size is greater than or equal to $100,000. We further use the information from the Fixed Investment Security
Database (FISD) to limit the sample to U.S. dollar-denominated, senior corporate debt issues. We also
exclude privately placed, putable, exchangeable, perpetual and preferred securities. As a large number of ﬁrms
in our sample issue callable bonds, we include callable issues and substitute the call date for the maturity date
if the call is in-the-money. The most appropriate way to identify whether a bond is likely to be called
is to select bonds where the yield-to-call is lower than the yield-to-maturity. However, in the absence of
yield-to-call data, we compare the coupon rate to the yield-to-maturity. If the yield-to-maturity is lower than
the coupon rate, then we substitute the call date for the maturity date of the bond issue. To estimate a daily
yield from the transaction data we use the mid-point of all of the trades during the day to reﬂect the day’s
yield. Our ﬁnal sample consists of 796 unique ﬁrms and 2097 bond issues.
Matching the high frequency transaction data of TRACE with annual data from Compustat presents a
challenge for our sampling frequency. This is further complicated by the fact that many ﬁrms have more than
one bond issue being reported. Of the ﬁrms in our sample, 359 have only one bond issue. The average number
of bond issues per ﬁrm in our sample is 2.6 and the median is 2. The maximum number of issues per ﬁrm in our
sample is 25. Bessembinder et al. (2008) describe three possible approaches to sampling bond data: (1) a rep-
resentative bond approach, (2) a bond-level approach and (3) a ﬁrm-level approach. In the representative
bond approach, researchers select one bond per ﬁrm, even though the ﬁrm may have several diﬀerent bond
issues outstanding. This approach faces serious limitations because diﬀerent bond issues will have diﬀerent
durations; selecting one representative bond will necessarily ignore eﬀects on other parts of the yield curve.6 In July 2007, the NASD and the member regulation, enforcement and arbitrage functions of the NYSE were consolidated to form the
Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA). The history of the TRACE system is available online at www.ﬁnra.org/compliance/
MarketTransparency/TRACE/FAQ/P085430.
7 Based on TRACE documentation, trade errors that are caught the same trading day are corrected by entering a TRC_ST of C
(cancellation) or W (correction or ‘was’). These corrections are coded with the original message sequence number to identify a corrected
trade. If a trade error is caught after the trade date, then it is corrected by entering an ASOF_CD of R (reversal) and an A (as of trade).
These corrections are not linked to the original message sequence number so they must be matched based on trade date, time, price and
volume. Occasionally, there is more than one original trade that matches a reversal, and occasionally there is more than one reversal trade
for which no original trade can be found. We select the ﬁrst matching original trade for each reversal and if no original trade can be found,
then the reversal is assumed to be entered in error and is eliminated.
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a separate observation. Although this is preferred to the representative approach, it is not without problems of
its own. Bessembinder et al. (2008) point out that this approach faces correlations across observations within
the ﬁrm, and thus may weight higher quality ﬁrms more heavily as they are more likely to have multiple bond
issues. The ﬁrm-level approach uses a market-value weighted average yield of all of the bonds per day per ﬁrm
as the cost of debt capital. This composite measure of the cost of debt is free from the cross-correlation prob-
lem of the bond-level approach. In our study, we present results for both the bond-level and ﬁrm-level
approaches.
3. Univariate analysis
Using the TZ earnings smoothing statistic, we perform a univariate analysis of the characteristics of high
and low smoothing ﬁrms over the 2002–2007 sample period. Table 2 presents the results from comparing the
top quartile with the bottom quartile (based on the TZ statistic) of the sample ﬁrms. By deﬁnition, the high
smoothing ﬁrms have more negative TZ statistics with a mean of 0.99, whereas the low smoothing ﬁrms have
less negative TZ statistics with a mean of 0.60.
Table 2 Panel A shows that the sample ﬁrms with smoother earnings are larger, more proﬁtable, have more
operating cash ﬂows and have more growth options, than the ﬁrms with less smooth earnings. Higher smooth-
ing ﬁrms have signiﬁcantly lower debt-to-asset ratios—26 percent, on average, compared with lower smooth-
ing ﬁrms with 37 percent, on average. The Z-score for the higher smoothing ﬁrms is signiﬁcantly higher than
for low smoothing ﬁrms, indicating that higher smoothing ﬁrms are ﬁnancially healthier. Therefore, we con-
trol for all of these ﬁrm characteristics in our multivariate analysis. In addition, the statistics show that ﬁrms
with smoother earnings also engage in more earnings management, as measured by the absolute value of dis-
cretionary accruals, DAP, estimated as the residual from regression (1). This suggests that income smoothing
is related to earnings management. Indeed, we ﬁnd that the reverse rank of TZ statistic and the absolute value
of DAP are positively correlated at 0.15.
Table 2 Panel B shows that the high smoothing ﬁrms have lower average bond yields and higher average
bond ratings than their low smoothing counterparts. The average bond yield for high smoothing ﬁrms is 5.35
percent, whereas the average bond yield for low smoothing ﬁrms is 6.78 percent, and this diﬀerence is statis-
tically signiﬁcant at conventional levels. Likewise, the average bond rating for high smoothing ﬁrms is 6.9
(approximately A-where the scale begins at 1 for AAA, 2 for AA+, . . ., and 22 for D). The average bond rat-
ing for low smoothing ﬁrms is 11.14, which corresponds to a BB+ rating. In addition, the bonds issued by top
smoothing ﬁrms exhibit shorter terms to maturity and terms to call, lower coupon rates and higher amounts
outstanding. In our subsequent multivariate regressions, we control for the above bond characteristics.
Overall, these univariate results provide preliminary evidence that ﬁrms which smooth earnings have lower
cost of debt, suggesting that they are signaling rather than garbling earnings information.
4. Multivariate analysis
4.1. Baseline regressions
We now turn to a multivariate analysis of the cost of debt capital by estimating a pooled cross-sectional
time-series model using both a bond-level approach and a ﬁrm-level approach. The dependent variable is
the daily yield per bond (bond-level approach) or the weighted average daily yield per ﬁrm (ﬁrm-level
approach). The key explanatory variable is the income smoothing ranking (IS), which we expect to have a
positive coeﬃcient in the case of garbling and a negative coeﬃcient in the case of signaling. The control
variables are included based on prior research, which indicates the variables’ explanatory power on cost of
debt capital. Some of the control variables with predicted signs are described below.
4.1.1. Firm-specific factors
We ﬁrst control for various ﬁrm characteristics, such as size, growth, proﬁtability, Zscore and tangibility.
These control variables deal with potential endogeneity; speciﬁcally, that ﬁrms with certain characteristics may
Table 2
Univariate analysis.
Variable (1) Top quartile of TZ statistic
(less smooth earnings)
(2) Bottom quartile of TZ statistic
(smoother earnings)
(3) = (2)(1) diﬀerence between
bottom and top quartiles
Panel A: Sample firm characteristics
TZ statistic Mean 0.60 0.99 0.39***
Median 0.77 0.99 0.22***
Total assets Mean 12,608.24 26,299.32 13,691.08***
Median 9668.31 16,361.00 6692.69***
Sales Mean 14,340.68 18,462.36 4121.68***
Median 9614.00 15,701.00 6087***
Net income Mean 513.78 2172.89 1659.11***
Median 286.14 1257.00 970.86***
Operating cash
ﬂow
Mean 1281.00 3216.24 1935.24***
Median 674.06 1846.54 1172.48***
Market value Mean 20,796.62 50,962.05 30,165.43***
Median 14,275.19 31,785.13 17,509.94***
Market-to-
book
Mean 1.66 2.08 0.42***
Median 1.46 1.95 0.49***
Return on
assets
Mean 0.028 0.075 0.047***
Median 0.036 0.075 0.039***
Debt to assets Mean 0.37 0.26 0.11***
Median 0.33 0.24 0.09***
Zscore Mean 1.69 2.00 0.31***
Median 1.66 1.88 0.22***
Earnings
management
Mean 0.07 0.38 0.31***
Median 0.04 0.11 0.07***
Panel B: Sample bond characteristics
TZ statistic Mean 0.60 0.99 0.39***
Median 0.77 0.99 0.22***
Weighted
average yield
Mean 6.78 5.35 1.43***
Median 6.16 5.26 0.90***
Term to
maturity
(years)
Mean 6.73 6.29 0.44***
Median 7.01 6.34 0.67***
Term to call
(years)
Mean 6.40 5.97 0.43***
Median 6.94 6.28 0.66***
S&P rating Mean 11.14 6.90 4.24***
Median 10 6 4.00***
Coupon rate Mean 6.95 6.10 0.85***
Median 6.90 5.79 1.11***
Amount
outstanding
Mean 565,356.46 741,749.17 176,392.71***
Median 500,000 750,000 250,000***
This table presents the means and medians of sample ﬁrm (Panel A) and bond (Panel B) characteristics by the top and bottom quartile of
income smoothing. Variable deﬁnitions are given in the Appendix.
*** Indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
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smoothing. For example, Ronen and Sadan (1981) use a signaling model and contend that only ﬁrms with
good prospects elect to smooth. We discuss some of the following ﬁrm level control variables.
 Sales revenue to proxy for ﬁrm size, as larger ﬁrms can have economies of scale that would serve to reduce
credit spreads (predicted negative sign).8
 Return on assets, which is a proxy for proﬁtability as more proﬁtable ﬁrms will have lower credit spreads
(predicted negative sign).
 Firm volatility, with higher volatility implying higher default risk and thus higher credit spreads (predicted
positive sign).
 Market-to-book ratio, where market value is the market value of equity plus the book value of debt and
book value is the book value of assets. This is to control for diﬀerences in investment opportunities, with
higher ratios implying either higher or lower credit spreads. High growth ﬁrms have more growth oppor-
tunities and this may be related to lower debt cost. In contrast, high growth option ﬁrms may have more
intangibles and thus few tangibles in the company and this is related to higher debt costs (sign ambiguous).4.1.2. Instrument-specific factors
 Bond coupon, which is a proxy for any tax eﬀects (sign ambiguous).
 Illiquidity, following Chen et al. (2007), who ﬁnd that less liquid issues are associated with higher bond
yield spreads (predicted positive sign).4.1.3. Market or macroeconomic factors
The literature suggests that credit spread and term spread are good proxies of macroeconomic conditions
and help explain stock and bond returns (Chen et al., 1986; Fama and French, 1993). Speciﬁcally, credit
spreads tend to widen in recessions and shrink in expansions (Collin-Dufresne et al., 2001), as investors require
more compensation for increased default risk in bad economic times. High (low) term spreads are often used
as an indicator of good (bad) economic prospects. As a result, we use the following two variables to proxy for
macroeconomic conditions.
 Term spread is the slope of the prevailing treasury yield curve, often measured by the diﬀerence between
10- and 2-year treasury bond yields (predicted negative sign).
 Credit spread is the slope of the corporate debt yield curve, measured as the diﬀerence in yields between
AAA corporate bond yields and BAA corporate bond yields (predicted positive sign).
Our complete model is estimated as8 Sal
Issue sAVEYIELDj;t ¼ a0 þ a1ISj þ a2SIZEj þ a3DEBT j þ a4ROAj þ a5VOLAT j þ a6MKBKj
þ a7COVERAGEj þ a8TANGIBj þ a9ZSCOREj þ a10CALLj þ a11 lnMAT j
þ a12COUPON þ a13SP j þ a14ILLIQj þ a15 lnOUTST j þ a16TSPREADj
þ a17CSPREADj þ ej; ð3Þwhere AVEYIELD is the median daily yield per bond as reported by TRACE or the average of the median
daily yield across all of the bond issues per ﬁrm; IS is the income smoothing ranking following Tucker and
Zarowin (2006); SIZE is the natural logarithm of beginning of period net sales; DEBT is the beginning of per-
iod ratio of total debt to total assets; ROA is the beginning of period net income over total assets; VOLAT ises revenue may also proxy for instrument liquidity (an instrument-speciﬁc factor), as it may reﬂect ﬁrm size and therefore issue size.
ize is an often-used proxy for bond liquidity (Yu, 2005).
Table 3
Eﬀect of income smoothing on the cost of debt.
Dep. Var. = cost of debt (1) Bond level (2) Bond level (3) Firm level (4) Firm level
IS 2.07*** 0.36*** 2.19*** 0.42***
(7.79) (3.20) (5.75) (2.66)
SIZE 0.10** 0.10
(2.19) (1.50)
DEBT 0.42 0.39
(1.23) (0.80)
ROA 4.00*** 4.26***
(5.33) (4.04)
VOLAT 1.63*** 1.48*
(2.91) (1.93)
MKBK 0.13*** 0.11*
(2.92) (1.84)
COVERAGE 0.07 0.03
(0.79) (0.23)
TANGIB 0.76** 0.78**
(2.45) (2.11)
ZSCORE 0.12* 0.12
(1.68) (1.33)
CALL 0.48** –
(1.98) –
lnMAT 0.38*** 0.37***
(11.56) (8.88)
COUPON 0.11*** 0.12***
(3.80) (2.60)
SP 0.25*** 0.25***
(11.29) (8.03)
ILLIQ 0.003 0.01
(0.59) (1.10)
lnOUTST 0.001 0.01
(0.02) (0.25)
TSPREAD 0.04 0.07
(0.89) (1.14)
CSPREAD 1.06*** 1.07***
(8.02) (5.28)
Intercept 4.49 0.92 8.37 1.07
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (1.48)
Year, 2-digit SIC, and bond type eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 202,689 183,932 113,965 103,767
Adj. R2 0.41 0.75 0.38 0.73
This table presents bond-level (Columns 1 and 2) and ﬁrm-level (Columns 3 and 4) OLS regression results. In Columns (1) and (2), the
dependent variable is the daily yield for each bond. In Columns (3) and (4), the dependent variable is the average of the median daily yield
across all of the bond issues per ﬁrm. Bond type eﬀects refer to diﬀerent bonds including senior note, unsecured note, senior debenture,
discount note, index linked security, etc. Detailed deﬁnitions of the variables are reported in the Appendix. Heteroscedasticity robust T-
statistics are given in parentheses and are adjusted for clustering within bond issues in Columns (1) and (2) and within ﬁrms in Columns (3)
and (4).
* Indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
** Indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
*** Indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
S. Li, N. Richie / China Journal of Accounting Research 9 (2016) 175–190 183the beginning of period standard deviation of CRSP daily equity returns using 252 days prior to bond spread
measurements;MKBK is the beginning of period ratio of market value of the equity plus the book value of the
debt to book value of the assets; COVERAGE is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if operating cash
ﬂows are greater than current liabilities; TANGIB is beginning of period property plant and equipment over
total assets; ZSCORE is Altman’s Z score; CALL is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 if the bond is
184 S. Li, N. Richie / China Journal of Accounting Research 9 (2016) 175–190callable; lnMAT is the natural logarithm of the bond maturity measured in months (the natural log of the term
to call is substituted if the bond call is in the money); COUPON is the annual coupon rate of the bond; SP is
the S&P credit rating converted to a numeric scale, where 1 represents AAA and 22 represents a rating of D;
ILLIQ is the standard deviation of the price during the week divided by the total volume traded during the
week; lnOUTST is the natural logarithm of the amount of bonds outstanding; TSPREAD is the term spread
estimated as the diﬀerence between the 10-year treasury yield and the 2-year treasury yield as reported by the
Federal Reserve Board of Governors; and CSPREAD is the credit spread estimated as the diﬀerence between
AAA corporate bond yields and BAA corporate bond yields as reported by the Federal Reserve Board of
Governors.
Table 3 presents the results of the baseline regression results. Columns (1) and (2) include bond-level regres-
sions and Columns 3 and 4 include ﬁrm-level regressions. Consistent with our univariate analysis, the coeﬃ-
cients on IS in all four columns are negative and signiﬁcant, indicating that higher earnings smoothing ﬁrms
are associated with lower cost of debt. To illustrate the economic signiﬁcance, we take the bond level regres-
sion in Column (1) as an example. Given a one standard deviation (0.27) change in the income smoothing
measure, the coeﬃcient of 2.07 corresponds to 2.07  0.27 = 0.56(%). That is, a one standard deviation
increase in income smoothing corresponds to a reduction in the cost of debt by 56 basis points. This can be
compared to the statistics of the sample ﬁrms, which have an average bond yield of 5.8%, with a standard
deviation of 1.85% and a p5 yield of 2.6%. In Column (2), after we control for ﬁrm and bond characteristics
in the regression, the economic magnitude of income smoothing becomes smaller. The coeﬃcient, 0.36, is
translated into a reduction in the cost of debt of 0.36  0.27 = 0.1(%), which is 10 basis points.
The coeﬃcients on the control variables are generally as expected. SIZE is negative and signiﬁcant, indi-
cating that larger ﬁrms experience lower bond yields. ROA is negative and signiﬁcant, suggesting that more
proﬁtable ﬁrms experience lower borrowing costs. The variables VOLAT, CALL, lnMAT, COUPON and
SP are all positive and signiﬁcant, indicating that higher equity volatility, callable bonds, longer term bonds,
bonds with higher coupons and more poorly rated bonds are associated with higher cost of debt. The market-
to-book ratio is positively associated with the cost of debt. This is consistent with the notion that as ﬁrms with
more growth options are riskier, debt holders demand higher returns from such companies. The results also
show that credit spread is positively related to bond yields, suggesting that market-wide default risk is reﬂected
in the individual bond yields.
4.2. Exploring potential channels
The results in the previous section show that ﬁrms with smoother earnings exhibit lower debt costs. We
argue that this is consistent with the view that the information signaling eﬀect of income smoothing
(which reduces the cost of debt) dominates the garbling eﬀect (which increases the cost of debt). To further
disentangle the signaling eﬀect from the garbling eﬀect, this section explores the potential channels through
which income smoothing may aﬀect the cost of debt.
As we argue in the previous section, one mechanism of the signaling eﬀect is that the ﬁrm uses smoother
earnings to reduce the perceived probability of default and thus reduce the cost of borrowing funds. For exam-
ple, Lang and Maﬀett (2011) mention that ‘‘a smooth earnings stream may potentially decrease assessments of
default risk and, thus, decrease the debt cost of capital.” We thus expect that the signaling eﬀect of income
smoothing should be stronger in ﬁrms with higher default risk, because income smoothing may have a greater
beneﬁt for ﬁrms with higher default risk than those with lower default risk.9 In Table 4 Panel A, we conduct a
subsample analysis by the degree of default risk, as proxied by ﬁrm equity volatility, bond credit ratings and
ﬁrm proﬁtability. We ﬁnd that the reduction eﬀect of income smoothing on the cost of debt is signiﬁcant only
in the subsamples of ﬁrms with higher default risk, that is, those with higher volatility, lower credit ratings and
lower proﬁtability.9 It may also be more costly for riskier ﬁrms to smooth earnings. Ronen and Sadan (1981) argue that only ﬁrms with good prospects
smooth earnings, because borrowing from the future could be disastrous to a poorly performing ﬁrm if a problem explodes in the near
term.
Table 4
Subsample analysis.
Panel A: Subsample analysis by information opaqueness
Dep. Var. = cost of debt (1) Large ﬁrms (Q4) (2) Middle-sized ﬁrms (Q2 and Q3) (3) Small ﬁrms (Q1) (4) Low volatility (5) High volatility
Income smoothing 0.034 0.44*** 0.64*** 0.0018 0.70***
(0.16) (2.91) (2.68) (0.02) (3.44)
Control variables and intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year, 2-digit SIC, and bond type eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 46,172 91,819 45,941 92,042 91,890
Adj. R2 0.66 0.75 0.76 0.70 0.78
Panel B: Subsample analysis by probability of default
Dep. Var. = cost of debt (1) High ratings (A or above) (2) Low ratings (BBB+ or below) (3) High proﬁtability (ROA) (4) Low proﬁtability (ROA)
Income smoothing 0.0058 0.42*** 0.032 0.64***
(0.05) (2.61) (0.30) (3.05)
Control variables and intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year, 2-digit SIC, and bond type eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 87,027 96,905 91,689 92,243
Adj. R2 0.64 0.73 0.74 0.76
Panel C: Subsample analysis by corporate governance
Dep. Var. = cost of debt (1) CEO is board chair (2) CEO is not board chair (3) % inside directors above median (4) % inside directors below median
Income smoothing 0.30** 0.45* 0.31* 0.38**
(2.24) (1.89) (1.91) (2.12)
Control variables and intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year, 2-digit SIC, and bond type eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 128,067 45,580 89,546 94,386
Adj. R2 0.79 0.74 0.77 0.73
Dep. Var. = cost of debt (5) Blockholder
indicator = 0
(6) Blockholder
indicator = 1
(7) Institutional holdings below
median
(8) Institutional holdings above
median
Income smoothing 0.19 0.46*** 0.34* 0.40***
(0.79) (3.89) (1.78) (3.06)
Control variables and intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year, 2-digit SIC, and bond type
eﬀects
Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 31,198 152,101 91,029 92,903
Adj. R2 0.82 0.75 0.77 0.78
This table presents the results of the subsample analysis based on bond-level observations. The dependent variable is the cost of debt as measured by bond yield from trace. The results
for the ﬁrm-level analysis are similar and thus omitted. Detailed deﬁnitions of the variables are reported in the Appendix. Heteroscedasticity robust T-statistics are given in parentheses
and are adjusted for clustering within bond issues.
* Indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
** Indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
*** Indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
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Table 5
Robustness analysis.
Dep. Var.
= cost of
debt
(1) Bond
ﬁxed
eﬀects
(2) Firm ﬁxed
eﬀects (ﬁrm-
level analysis)
(3) Alternative
IS measure
(TZ statistic)
(4) Alternative IS
measure (TZ rank
with intercept)
(5) Alternative
IS measure
(LNW rank)
(6) Subsample
of single-bond
ﬁrms
(7) Subsample
of multiple-
bond ﬁrms
IS 0.07*** 0.12*** 0.45*** 0.28*** 0.23* 0.50*** 0.21***
(5.09) (5.91) (3.58) (2.74) (1.80) (12.30) (17.36)
SIZE 0.11*** 0.15*** 0.11** 0.10** 0.11 0.11*** 0.04***
(5.64) (5.16) (2.44) (2.11) (1.14) (5.66) (10.04)
DEBT 0.15** 0.06 0.32 0.38 0.71 1.30*** 0.26***
(2.49) (0.69) (0.96) (1.13) (1.45) (12.69) (6.51)
VOLAT 0.26*** 0.98*** 1.65*** 1.63*** 0.36 0.95*** 1.63***
(3.62) (9.57) (2.99) (2.93) (0.72) (6.29) (24.68)
CALL – – 0.44* 0.47* 0.70* 0.57*** 0.67***
– – (1.79) (1.82) (1.78) (8.19) (19.90)
lnMAT 0.85*** 0.36*** 0.38*** 0.38*** 0.31*** 0.14*** 0.42***
(113.78) (73.01) (11.55) (11.36) (6.80) (6.04) (110.35)
COUPON – 0.01 0.10*** 0.11*** 0.15*** 0.28*** 0.08***
– (1.56) (3.63) (3.74) (4.17) (21.66) (34.27)
SP – 0.08*** 0.25*** 0.26*** 0.36*** 0.19*** 0.26***
– (4.48) (11.42) (11.53) (7.68) (22.03) (118.41)
MKBK 0.13*** 0.11*** 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.34*** 0.09*** 0.15***
(18.63) (10.12) (3.14) (3.05) (4.80) (5.32) (28.90)
ILLIQ 0.002** 0.01*** 0.002 0.003 0.01** 0.01 0.002*
(2.04) (3.73) (0.54) (0.61) (2.40) (1.26) (1.89)
COVERAGE 0.07*** 0.001 0.06 0.04 0.42*** 0.34*** 0.06***
(6.80) (0.10) (0.69) (0.50) (3.33) (8.79) (5.67)
lnOUTST – 0.02*** 0.02 0.003 0.03 0.23*** 0.02***
– (4.79) (0.34) (0.06) (0.42) (7.55) (5.11)
ROA 1.62*** 2.65*** 3.96*** 4.02*** 8.18*** 6.18*** 3.25***
(13.72) (16.36) (5.18) (5.14) (6.28) (22.05) (42.10)
TANGIB 1.31*** 1.53*** 0.68** 0.73** 1.94*** 0.80*** 0.95***
(14.63) (12.43) (2.21) (2.35) (4.19) (11.11) (28.58)
ZSCORE 0.12*** 0.09*** 0.11 0.12 0.38*** 0.07*** 0.07***
(6.90) (4.18) (1.49) (1.62) (2.97) (3.65) (11.56)
TSPREAD 0.07*** 0.05*** 0.04 0.04 0.08* 0.21*** 0.01
(10.37) (4.92) (0.80) (0.84) (1.90) (6.81) (1.37)
CSPREAD 0.76*** 1.06*** 1.05*** 1.06*** 0.86*** 0.98*** 1.09***
(32.86) (30.22) (7.91) (8.00) (6.86) (9.46) (35.16)
Intercept 7.94*** 6.06*** 1.10 0.86 2.82 6.09*** 1.13
(37.93) (17.68) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (13.74) (0.00)
Year
eﬀects
Year eﬀects Year, 2-digit
SIC, and bond
type eﬀects
Year, 2-digit SIC,
and bond type
eﬀects
Year, 2-digit
SIC, and bond
type eﬀects
Year, 2-digit
SIC, and bond
type eﬀects
Year, 2-digit
SIC, and bond
type eﬀects
N 183,932 103,767 183,932 183,932 240,355 21,074 162,858
Adj. R2 0.88 0.86 0.75 0.75 0.67 0.81 0.75
This table presents the results of the robustness analysis. All of the regressions are based on bond-level observations, except those in
Column (2) which are based on ﬁrm-level observations. The results based on ﬁrm-level observations in Columns (3)–(7) are similar and
thus omitted. (1) is a bond ﬁxed-eﬀect regression and (2) is a ﬁrm ﬁxed-eﬀect regression. In Column (3), the original TZ statistic rather than
the reverse fractional ranking is used as the main independent variable. In Column (4), we perform a robustness analysis using the income
smoothing measure estimated from regression (1) with an intercept term, as in Eq. (7) of Kothari et al. (2005). In Column (5), we use the
standard deviation-based income smoothing measure estimated as in Leuz et al. (2003). (6) is based on the subsample of ﬁrms that have
only one bond issue and (7) is based on the subsample of ﬁrms that issue multiple bonds. The detailed deﬁnitions of the variables are
reported in the Appendix. Heteroscedasticity robust T-statistics are in parentheses.
* Indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
** Indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
*** Indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
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S. Li, N. Richie / China Journal of Accounting Research 9 (2016) 175–190 187In addition, if the signaling eﬀect is the dominating eﬀect of income smoothing on the cost of debt, then
such an eﬀect should be stronger in informationally opaque ﬁrms because information signaling is more
valuable in such ﬁrms. Therefore, as shown in Table 4 Panel B, we perform an analysis by grouping ﬁrms
by size. We ﬁnd that the eﬀect of income smoothing is only signiﬁcant in middle-sized and small ﬁrms and
is insigniﬁcant in large ﬁrms. Also, the magnitude of the coeﬃcient is larger in smaller ﬁrms than in
middle-sized ﬁrms. These results provide the evidence that the signaling eﬀect is stronger in more opaque ﬁrms.
Moreover, because volatile ﬁrms are less transparent, the results of the subsample analysis by ﬁrm volatility,
given in Panel A of Table 4, provide additional evidence that the signaling eﬀect is more signiﬁcant in less
transparent ﬁrms.
Furthermore, if the signaling role of income smoothing dominates the garbling role in determining bond
yields, then we should expect to see that the eﬀect of income smoothing in reducing debt costs is weaker in
ﬁrms that have a higher possibility of managerial garbling, such as ﬁrms with weaker governance. We thus
split the full sample into subsamples of ﬁrms with weaker and stronger corporate governance and then per-
form the regressions on these subsamples. The results, reported in Panel C of Table 4, show that the negative
eﬀect of income smoothing on bond yields is more negative in ﬁrms in which the CEO is not the board chair,
the fraction of inside directors is below sample median, there is at least one blockholder with more than ﬁve
percent of stock ownership and institutional stock holdings are above the sample median. These results
suggest that stronger corporate governance weakens the garbling eﬀect and makes the signaling eﬀect more
likely to dominate.4.3. Robustness analysis
This section performs various robustness checks and reports the results in Table 5. The eﬀect of income
smoothing on the cost of debt may be contaminated by endogeneity. For example, it is possible that unob-
served factors (such as an unobserved ﬁrm quality or culture) aﬀect a ﬁrm’s tendency to smooth its earnings
and at the same time these factors may be related to bond yields. Or, unobserved macroeconomic shocks
may aﬀect bond yields and a ﬁrm’s proﬁtability and thus its tendency to smooth earnings. To deal with
the issue, we use bond ﬁxed eﬀects and ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects regressions and report the results in Columns (1)
and (2) of Table 5. The results show that the eﬀect of income smoothing on bond yields remains negative
and signiﬁcant.
In Columns (3)–(5) of Table 5, we use alternative measures of income smoothing. First, in Column (3),
instead of using the reverse ranking of the TZ statistic, we use the original TZ statistic as the main independent
variable and ﬁnd that more negative correlations between the change in discretionary accruals and the change
in un-managed income (i.e., smoother earnings) correspond to lower cost of debt. Second, in the baseline
regressions, we follow Tucker and Zarowin (2006) and omit a separate intercept term in regression (1). We
thus perform a robustness analysis by estimating regression (1) with an intercept term, as in Eq. (7) of
Kothari et al. (2005). We obtain similar results and report them in Column (4) of Table 5. Third, in Column
(5), we use the standard deviation-based income smoothing measure estimated as in Leuz et al. (2003). The
results remain similar.
Finally, as some sample ﬁrms carry multiple bond issues and others have only one bond issue, we perform
regressions based on the subsample of ﬁrms with only one bond issue and the subsample of ﬁrms with multiple
bond issues. The results, reported in Columns (6) and (7) of Table 5, show that the negative eﬀects of income
smoothing remain robust.5. Conclusion
Using a large sample of publicly traded corporations and the Tucker and Zarowin (2006) measure of
income smoothing, we ﬁnd that income smoothing is a signiﬁcant determinant of the cost of debt capital, with
higher income smoothing ﬁrms exhibiting a lower contemporaneous cost of debt capital, as reﬂected by their
lower bond yields. These results contribute to our understanding of income smoothing. Studies using equity
market data suggest that smoothing improves the informational quality of past and current earnings. Our
188 S. Li, N. Richie / China Journal of Accounting Research 9 (2016) 175–190results using credit market data complement past ﬁndings from the equity market. Our credit market results
support the notion that income smoothing represents an information-signaling mechanism, rather than a
garbling device. Finally, the results reported here add to a growing body of empirical literature that speaks
to the issues of accounting transparency and asset pricing.
Despite this evidence, the ﬁndings reported here should be interpreted with the following two points in
mind. First, as with other studies of income smoothing, which include Tucker and Zarowin (2006), measure-
ment error in the discretionary accruals proxy used in this study may aﬀect the results. Second, ﬁrms in the
sample may be using private debt. It is possible that ﬁrms using more public debt tend to smooth earnings
more because the beneﬁt of information signaling could be larger in the public debt market than in the private
debt market. As a result, the eﬀect of income smoothing on the cost of public debt, as estimated in this paper,
might be larger than the eﬀect on the cost of private debt.10Appendix A. Variable definitions
In Panel A, total assets, net sales, net income and operating cash ﬂow are Compustat Data6, Data12,
Data18 and Data308, respectively. The market value of the ﬁrm in $millions is the market value of the
equity plus the book value of the debt, or the number of shares outstanding (Data25) times closing price
per share (Data199) plus the book value of assets (Data6) less the book value of the equity (Data60). The
market-to-book ratio is calculated as market value of the ﬁrm scaled by total assets. Return on assets is net
income over total assets. Debt-to-assets is total debt (Data9 + Data34) divided by total assets. Zscore is
Altman’s Zscore. Accruals are net income less operating cash ﬂow scaled by beginning of year market
value. In Panel B, weighted average yield, term to maturity and term to call are the annualized averages
associated with the publicly traded debt as reported by the TRACE system weighted by amount of debt
outstanding.Variable names10 Aivazian et al. (2006) reportVariable deﬁnitions and corresponding Compustat data itemsASSETS Total assets (data6)
Net income (NI) Net income before extraordinary items (data18)
ACCRUALS Total accruals estimated as net income before extraordinary items (data18) minus
operating cash ﬂows (data308), scaled by lagged total assets (data6)
DSALES Change in sales (data12) from t1 to t, scaled by lagged total assets (data6)
PPE Gross property, plant and equipment (data7) scaled by lagged total assets (data6)
ROA Return on assets, which is net income before extraordinary items (data18) over
lagged total assets (data6)
NDAP Non-discretionary accruals estimated as the ﬁtted value from the regression in
Table 1
DAP Discretionary accruals estimated as the residual from the regression in Table 1
PDI Pre-discretionary income, i.e., un-managed income, is calculated as net income
before extraordinary items (data18) minus discretionary accruals (DAP)
Corr(DDAP, DPDI) Correlation coeﬃcient between the change in discretionary accruals and the change
in un-managed income
IS Income smoothing ranking following Tucker and Zarowin (2006). This IS measure
is formed by converting the correlation, Corr(DDAP, DPDI), into reverse fractional
rankings by two-digit industry SIC code for each year. The IS measure ranges from
0 to 1 by industry-year with the highest income smoothers (more negative
correlations) having higher rankings, and lower income smoothers (less negative
correlations) having lower rankingsthat ﬁrms using public debt tend to smooth their dividends more than ﬁrms using the private debt market.
S. Li, N. Richie / China Journal of Accounting Research 9 (2016) 175–190 189LNW rank Income smoothing ranking following Leuz et al. (2003), with a higher rank
indicating smoother earnings. We estimate the LNW income smoothing measure as
the standard deviation of net income divided by the standard deviation of operating
cash ﬂows, with a larger value of the measure indicating less smooth earnings. The
LNW rank is then deﬁned as the reverse fractional rankings by two-digit industry
SIC code within each year. In estimating the LNW variable, net income is income
before extraordinary items (IB) scaled by lagged assets (AT). Operating cash ﬂows
are the diﬀerence between IB and total accruals, scaled by lagged AT. Total accruals
here are deﬁned as dACT–dLCT–dCHE + dDLC + dTXP–DP, where dACT is the
year by year change in current assets (ACT), dLCT is the change in current
liabilities (LCT), dCHE is the change in cash (CHE), dDLC is the change in debt in
current liabilities (DLC), dTXP is the change in income taxes payable (TXP) (dTXP
is treated as zero if missing), and DP is depreciation and amortizationEARNINGS
MANAGEMENTAbsolute value of DAP, discretionary accruals estimated as the residual from the
regression in Table 1AVEYIELD Median daily yield per bond as reported by TRACE or the average of the median
daily yield across all of the bond issues per ﬁrmSIZE Natural logarithm of beginning of period net sales
DEBT Beginning of period ratio of total debt to total assets
VOLAT Beginning of period standard deviation of CRSP daily equity returns using 252 days
prior to the bond spread measurements
CALL A dummy variable taking a value of 1 if the bond is callable
lnMAT Natural logarithm of the bond maturity measured in months or the natural log of
the term to call if the call is in the money
lnOUTST Natural logarithm of the amount of bonds outstanding
COUPON Annual coupon rate of the bond
SP S&P credit rating converted to a numeric scale where 1 represents AAA and 22
represents a rating of D (A greater numerical value indicates lower rating)
TSPREAD Term spread estimated as the diﬀerence between the 10-year and the 2-year treasury
yield as reported by the Federal Reserve Board of Governors
CSPREAD Credit spread estimated as the diﬀerence between AAA and BAA corporate bond
yields as reported by the Federal Reserve Board of Governors
MKBK Beginning of the period ratio of market value of the equity plus the book value of
the debt to book value of the assets
ILLIQ Standard deviation of the price during the week divided by the total volume traded
during the week
COVERAGE A dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if operating cash ﬂows are greater than
current liabilities
ROA Beginning of period net income over total assets
TANGIB Beginning of period property plant and equipment over total assets
ZSCORE Modiﬁed Altman’s (1968) Z-score = (1.2 working capital + .4 retained earnings
+ 3.3 EBIT+0.999 Sales)/Total Assets = (1.2 data179 + 1.4 data36 + 3.3 data170
+ 0.999 data12)/data6References
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